A simple modal logic for belief revision

We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussedmodel logic, beliefs

A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games

We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The second axiom says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that a different strategy is at least as good and she considers it possible that this alternative strategy is actually better than the chosen one. We show that common knowledge of this stronger notion of rationality characterizes the restriction to pure strategies of the iterated deletion procedure introduced by Stalnaker (1994).rationality, common belief, rationalizability, dominated strategies, game logic, frame characterization

Axiomatization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic

It is natural to think of belief revision as the interaction of belief and information over time. Thus branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief revision. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the ""next-time"" temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatization of the full set of AGM postulates.Belief revision, information, temporal logic, AGM theory

Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision

It is natural to think of belief revision as the interaction of belief and information over time. Thus branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief revision. We propose a logic based on three modal operators: a belief operator, an information operator and a next-time operator. Four logics of increasing strength are proposed. The first is a logic that captures the most basic notion of minimal belief revision. The second characterizes the qualitative content of Bayes' rule. The third provides an axiomatization of the AGM theory of belief revision and the fourth provides a characterization of the notion of plausibility ordering of the set of possible worlds.

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties.

We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency, which has an epistemic justification based on the AGM theory of belief revision.belief revision, plausibility order, consistency, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, Bayesian updating.

Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision

We study belief change branching-time structures. First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within the modal logic introduced in [Bonanno, Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 2007]. Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.iterated belief revision, branching time, information, belief, modal logic, AGM belief revision

A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision

In [G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a semantics for one-stage AGM belief revision was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this paper we extend the semantics of choice frames to deal with iterated belief revision and use the corresponding structures to analyze extensive-form games. Choice frames can be used to represent a player's initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it is her turn to move. If the frame satisfies AGM-consistency and a natural postulate for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a total pre-order on the set of histories. We show that three properties of this total pre-order, together with the hypothesis of agreement among players, provide a characterization of the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central component of the notion of sequential equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson [Econometrica, 1982].Choice function, AGM belief revision, extensive-form game, sequential equilibrium, iterated belief revision, backward induction.

INTERSUBJECTIVE CONSISTENCY OF BELIEFS AND THE LOGIC OF COMMON BELIEF

We characterize the class of n-person belief systems for which common belief has the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing condition states that individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common beliefs. It is shown to be considerably weaker than the consistency condition on interpersonal beliefs implied by the common knowledge assumption: it allows individuals to ""agree to disagree"" and to be quite incorrect about others7 beliefs.

Non-cooperative game theory

This is the first draft of the entry “Game Theory” to appear in the Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science (edited by Ian Jarvie & Jesús Zamora Bonilla), Part III, Chapter 16.game theory, epstemic foundations, incomplete information,epstemic foundations, incomplete information

Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.Belief revision, common belief, counterfactual, dynamic game, model of a game, rationality